UNITED NATIONS ⬡ NATIONS UNIES

POLICY BRIEF ON
MARITIME SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

Background and definition

Maritime piracy is at the same time an old and a modern topic: from Cicero to Homerus, from Grotius to the modern practices, piracy has been a topic of significant interest. . Maritime piracy is the *crimen iuris gentium* for excellence and it has taken different shapes during the history. Paradoxically, this crime was once permitted and even incentivized openly by States and governments, who gave "lettres de course" as "passe-partout" to plunder the seas.

The modern definition of **piracy** is contained in art. 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS), signed in Montego Bay in 1982.

"Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

> *(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:*
> > *(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;*
> > *(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;*
> *(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;*
> *(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)."*

An unlawful act, in order to be treated and categorized as "piracy", must be conducted on the high seas, i.e. outside a State's waters. This legal definition is crucial from a jurisdiction point of view. Piracy is an international crime that entails universal jurisdiction: every ship can arrest a pirate on the high seas and judge him or her under its flag's jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the attacks to the vessels that occur in the territorial waters of a country, are labeled as "**armed robbery**". According to the International Maritime Organization, "armed robbery against ships" is "Any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such as a ship, within the State's jurisdiction over such offences".

Today, piracy and armed robbery against ships are one of the most serious threats to maritime security in the world. After the last years of increased attacks in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, this phenomenon is fast

expanding towards other geographical areas, such as West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea.

The problem of piracy clearly demonstrates the challenges of transnational crime and the increasing interdependence of States and people in a globalised world. The human, commercial and security consequences of piracy, means that a large number of States and international and regional organizations have a stake in finding more effective and sustainable solutions.

This brief will seek to give a short but comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of piracy and armed robbery in West Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. It will focus on the Security Sector Reform's wide approach as well as it will investigate the West Africa regional approach to deal with this new threat. Finally, the paper will take into account the measures that the regional States took – or should take- in the maritime security context.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in West Africa

Piracy and armed robbery off the coasts of Somalia has taken a big place in the international community's agenda in the past few years. From 2008 to 2011 the number of the attacks in this part of the world increased dramatically and many measures have since been taken to address this problem, mostly off-shore. These responses from the international community have led to significant results in reducing the number of attacks. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), ship attacks have seriously decreased in 2012, when 75 incidents were reported, compared with 237 in 2011. These 75 ship attacks account for 25% of incidents worldwide. Moreover, the number of Somali hijackings was halved from 28 in 2011 to 14 last year.

Recently, the attention has shifted towards piracy and armed robbery in West Africa. This maritime threat in the region, contrary to what many people think, is not a new problem, since attacks were reported already in 2003. From 2006/2007 many regional actors and international subjects started to have meetings and debates on the possible solutions to tackle the problem. Nevertheless, 150 attacks were reported having occurred in West Africa in 2012.[1]

Certainly, piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden and off West Africa have some **commonalities**:

Root causes/driving factors: Social inequality and lack of livelihoods on land
Both Somalia and the West African regions suffer of an extremely high level of poverty and they are rated among the states with the worst indicators of human development[2]. Somalia, after Siad Barre's collapse, knew a frightening "invasion" of

---

[1] http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb
[2] The Failed States Index, Fund for Peace, Foreign Policy Magazine,

its – very rich – waters from foreign fishing vessels, which started to ravage Somali fishing heritage. On land, illegal dumping of toxic wastes raised dramatically. These and other problems caused a decline in the number of opportunities for a legitimate livelihood, so that many men in the region were easily recruited as pirates by the war lords, for survival.

On the other side of the African continent, most of the Gulf of Guinea coastal states suffer from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), mostly due to a weak state control over its territorial waters, as well as over its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). The region also knows a worrying proliferation of small arms and light weapons, whose availability contributes to the frequency and intensity of conflicts and criminality. Again, young people often face no hope for the future and convert themselves in pirates and criminals. Nevertheless, even though some of the coastal States of West Africa have state and judicial systems which are quite weak, there is no   void   of   authority,   like   that   in   Somalia

Unreported attacks

Both for Somalia and for the Gulf of Guinea, the number of attacks of piracy or armed robbery that are reported to the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center (IMBPRC) is most probably smaller than the real number of attacks. This is due to a number of reasons, such as the increase in the insurance premiums for ship owners whose vessels are captured. Also, very frequently, ship-owners fear that reporting an attack, and in so doing opening an official dossier, slow down and possibly stop the hijacked vessel for long weeks. When a boat is seized, criminals ask for ransom and frequently, if it is immediately paid, it is released and can start carrying goods again. If the authorities are involved, long time can pass before all the official inquires are carried out and time is the factor that interests the most shipping companies. Each day that a vessel doesn't sail, this entails a big loss of moneys.

Costs of piracy

Piracy and armed robbery both in the Gulf of Aden and in West Africa have tremendous consequences in terms of monetary and human costs. Crew members can be seized for months (at the end of December 2012, after 1000 days in captivity, the 22 remaining crew of the MV Iceberg 1 were freed[3]). Currently, according to the IMB, 139 hostages are still held by pirates globally. Many of these victims and their families suffer of trauma and psychological disorders, as well after their release.

Over the past few years, several countries (such as USA, India and China) and international organizations such as the EU and the NATO deployed a big number (between 12 and 20, depending on the years) of warships to patrol the Gulf of Aden. According to some estimations, the monthly cost for the deployment of a warship is around 1 million dollars, which means around 150 – 250 millions dollars per year.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=3100&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.co m/story/cms.php?story_id=3100Retrieved September 1, 2009
[3] http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/rescued-hostages-of-mv-iceberg-1-recount-their-32-month-pirate-ordeal

Moreover, given the risk involved in transporting goods through both the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea, insurance premiums have risen tremendously. Ship-owners have also to afford the ransoms' cost as well as negotiation and legal costs related to that.

2. On the other hand, piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden and in the Gulf of Guinea also have many similarities.

The legal distinction mentioned in the introduction between piracy and armed robbery against ships, is crucial. Piracy is an international crime that entails universal jurisdiction: every ship can arrest a pirate on the high seas and judge him or her under its flag's jurisdiction. The attacks in the Gulf of Aden often occur thousands of miles away from shore, always further from the latest attack. Given the vast area of operation, this represents a greater challenge for the navies of the various countries patrolling the area. On the contrary, 80% of what is reported in the Gulf of Guinea occurs within territorial waters – and often in ports' waters - and is thus a domestic issue that falls under the national jurisdiction of the respective coastal state. That is why is more legally correct to talk about "armed robbery against ships", for the attacks and the hijackings that occur in this part of the world.

Type of attack
Piracy attacks in the waters off the coasts of Somalia have generally followed the same pattern: hijacking of ship -> seizure of vessel and crew -> demands for ransom -> payment of ransom -> release of crew and vessel. Interestingly, few cases of wide-spread or systematic violence or abuse towards the captured crew members by Somali pirates have been reported. In the Gulf of Guinea, attacks' often target oil tankers[4]: in the majority of cases part cargoes of gasoil are subsequently stolen before the vessels is released. All the attacks usually involve high levels of violence against the crew[5].

"Failed"/"weak/"fragile" States
Somalia was, before the civil war started in 1991, one of the Africa's more ethnically and culturally homogeneous countries. Nevertheless, the clans and the different territorial and economic identities stratified the Somali society[6]. Much of the

---

[4] "Piracy and Maritime Security. West Africa" by Denis M. Tull
[5] Speech from the IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan
http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000515

[6] *Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy‖* di C. J. Coyne, Foreign Policy Analysis (2006) vol. 2, pag. 343–360. See also —*Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention‖* di Abdi Ismail Samatar, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 30, num. 4 (Dic. 1992), pag. 625-641 ; —*Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence: The Dissolution of the Somali Nation-State‖* di Catherine Besteman, The American Ethnologist, vol. 23, num. 3 (Agosto, 1996), pag. 579-596; —*Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, and Piracy: An overview, and recent developments"* di J.Knott, http://www.hfw.com/somalia-the-gulf-of-aden-and-piracy-an-overview-and-recent-developments/; —*Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism,"* di K. Menkhaus, 2004, New York, Routledge

existing literature defines Somalia as a "failed State"[7]. From a legal and a political point of view, a "failed state" has three main characteristics. Firstly, the territorial aspect: failed states are essentially associated with internal problems, which have often a transnational impact. The second characteristic deals with the political aspect: very often in those states face the legal system and the public order's collapse. Finally, the functional aspect: failed states usually lack institutions that can represent them at an international level and that can be influenced by the external world. Recently, Somalia has known an improvement in its political situation and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with US President Obama in Washington on January the 17th this year.

On the other hand, despite the many conflicts that have ravaged West Africa in the late years, the regional states have governments and an institutional apparatus well established, even though weak. Moreover, states such as Nigeria have big oil reserves. This difference entails consequences regarding the kind of answer to piracy and armed robbery by the State. A (ex?) failed state such as Somalia lack of any tool (coastguards, jails, courts to prosecute pirates) to face the aforementioned problems, whereas in States such as Nigeria, the institutions already in place are unable to pursue territorial waters' governance due to a lack of ocean policies.

3. Against this background, important questions arise: would the measures that have been taken to tackle maritime piracy off the coasts of Somalia work in the Gulf of Guinea's context? Have the measures taken in Somalia merely addressed the symptoms, or have they effectively and sustainably addressed the root causes?

Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)
Among the various measures taken to prevent acts of piracy off the coasts of Somalia, is the _Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor_ (IRTC) established in the Gulf of Aden. The IRTC consisted of two different transit lanes[8], each lane is 5 miles wide with a 2 mile separation between the lanes. The IRTC's aim was to create "groups transits" of vessels sailing at the same speed, so that they exploited the double protection of being in a group and being convoyed and assisted by the military forces present in the area. From another point of view, being the risky area so big, the ITRC was a useful way for the international warships to best coordinate and optimize their efforts.

As already said above, the costs to deploy warships in the Gulf of Aden and in the Somali Basin are high. Piracy in the area is not yet completely extirpated, so the military presence could not be just deployed in another area of the world such as West Africa. "The continued presence of the navies is vital to ensuring that Somali piracy remains low" IMB Director Captain Pottengal Mukundan has said., before concluding "this progress could easily be reversed if naval vessels were to be

---

[7] This term was used for the first time by Gerald B. Helman and Steven Ratner in their article _"Saving Failed States"_, Foreign Policy, Winter 1992–1993
[8] See http://www.armalink.org/belgeler/MSC%28HOA%29%20-%20IRTC.pdf

withdrawn from the area"[9]. To deploy the same (or even fewer) number of warships in the Gulf of Guinea would be a huge cost both for the international organizations.

From another point of view, as mentioned, the specificity of the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea is that they occur mostly in territorial waters, so really close to shore. The main attacks' target is oil tankers that charge oil from Nigeria and from the neighboring ports, so it is important to ask if an international naval presence would be really useful in the area to dissuade of committing those unlawful acts. Would a transit corridor really useful?

International maritime navy forces
The problem of maritime piracy off the coasts of Somalia hit the headlines in relation to the WFP's vessels which were carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia. Since 2007 those vessels started to be attacked the more and more frequently: in October 2007, the IMO Secretary General and the WFP Executive Director issued a joint communiqué, warning the international community on the fact that *"the actions of pirates operating in the waters off Somalia threaten the sea lanes in the region and could endanger the fragile supply line for food assistance to Somalis whose lives have been shattered by more than 15 years of civil conflict, political instability and recurring natural disasters".*

Following this call, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon requested the States whose navy was present in the Gulf of Aden to assure the delivery of humanitarian aid, by escorting WFP's vessels transiting in the area. NATO and EU countries answered quickly: the former launched first the mission *Allied Provider*, followed by the *Ocean Shield's* one, whereas the latter created the EU NAVFOR ATALANTA mission. Te EU's mandate consisted of *"protect vessels of the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid and African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) -- protect vulnerable shipping -- help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery -- monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia"[10].*

In addition to those missions, a third one was established in 2008, the Combined Task Force 150: more than 20 states provided military forces. In January 2009 the US took delivery of the task force, re named Combined Task Force 151. This mission has no geographical limits and it's programmed in order to create an international structure that combines military forces, information sharing and joint patrolling. In 2008 the Combined Maritime Forces have created the *Maritime Security Patrol Area* (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden, whose aim was supporting IMO in its efforts to insure the security of the vessels transiting in that high risk zone. Beside these missions, many States such as India and China, deployed warships in the area in order to patrol and escort vessels transiting there.

All the above mentioned military missions where indeed very helpful in preventing and combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. That said, their cost was huge (see above

---

[9] http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb
[10] http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/

the point *costs of piracy*), which means that in particular because of the global financial crisis, it is difficult for international organizations and States to undertake the same successful response in West Africa. It must be also highlighted once again that "piracy" in this area is basically different to the one in the Gulf of Aden, which means that international responses should be different and adapt themselves.

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coasts of Somalia
On January the 14th 2009 the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coasts of Somalia[11] was launched in New York by a US initiative, supported by IMO. The Contact Group represents a mechanism of cooperation whose aim is to develop concrete answers to the challenges raised by the Security Council in its Resolution 1851 (2008) as well as to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. Within the Contact Group there are five main Working Groups that deal with:

1. military coordination, information sharing and the establishment of a regional coordination centre;
2. legal issues;
3. reinforcing the transports world's awareness of the threat represented by piracy;
4. enhancing the public information on every aspect of piracy;
5. coordination of international efforts to identify and disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers.

This international forum brought together more than 60 countries and international organizations, with the aim to share their information and knowledge in the fight against piracy, representing a successful example of cooperation.

Such cooperation would surely be very useful for the West Africa as well, though it could be conceived slightly different. It will not be (only) "foreign" states sharing information on attacks in the region, but regional countries. In Ghana there is a project in its way to be developed that have some points in common with the DCoC. The Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC)'s aim is to create a network where vessels transiting risked areas in West Africa can share and receive information and can be therefore helped to develop situational awareness.

Djibouti Code of Conduct
The IMO organized an important meeting in Djibouti from the 26 to the 29 of January 2009 when the Djibouti Code of Conduct has been adopted[12]. The Code takes into consideration and it promotes many Security Council's resolutions' [13] points that concern piracy off the coasts of Somalia. The Code's work is based on 4 main pillars: information sharing, capacity building, legislations' updates and

---

[11]See http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/121054.htm;
http://www.thecgpcs.org/main.do?action=main
[12] The signing countries were Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldive, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen.
[13] SC's Resolution 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008)

regional training. The first one is also the most important one, since the information sharing represents the way to improve collaboration and coordination among regional states. The information shared come from the vessels and the warships sailing in the area. Three years after its creation, the Code has shown its success and its utility in combating piracy and armed robbery off the coasts of Somalia.

Concerning the West and Central Africa's situation, very recently, in January 2013, the European Union launched a new project to combat armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, named the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO)[14]. Its aim is to help West Africa's regional countries to improve safety along their main shipping routes. This goal will (would?) be reached by training national coastguards and by creating a information sharing's network among the regional countries. The project will be rolled out from January 2013 in 7 African coastal states: Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Sâo Tomé and Principe and Togo.

Best Management Practice
The Best Management Practices [15] are recommendations which have been prepared and adopted by the main world's shipping companies. The companies implement these recommendations through the vessel's captain. Examples of them are: to show pirates the willing to auto-protect their vessel, not being an attractive target for them; do not surrender immediately after the first sign of threat; monoeuvre the vessel in order to escape the attacks; equip the vessel with visible (deterrent) and physical (preventive) protection measures, such as razor wire, use of water/ foam, etc. Experience and data collected by Naval/Military forces, shows that the application of the recommendations made a significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of piracy.

For the purposes of the BMP the term 'piracy' includes all acts of violence against ships, its crew and cargo. This includes armed robbery and attempts to board and take control of the ship, wherever this may take place. That is why these measures should be implemented as much as possible also by vessels sailing in high risks areas in West Africa, such as in the Gulf of Guinea, to prevent as much as possible the attacks.

Relevance for SSR

Most of the commentators agree in saying that piracy and armed robbery (especially in Somalia) are symptoms of a broader problem: the weakness of the States and the lack of sustainable live hood alternatives. If the problems' roots aren't addressed, piracy will never end. Moreover, it must be underlined that most of the international

---

[14] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-14_en.htm
[15] Put in the Annex 1of the IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1332 IMO of June the 16th 2009.
http://www.ukpandi.com/ukpandi/resource.nsf/Files/BMP%20Piracy%20210809/$FILE/BMP+Piracy+210809.pdf . Last version available at http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf

efforts were leaded by the international actors and locals were slightly or not at all involved. If someone can argue that in the case of Somalia there were almost no local interlocutors to whom collaborating with, in the Gulf of Guinea more can be and should be done in sharpening local's capabilities to address attacks on the sea. International efforts should be directed towards sustaining local entities and institutions in building their own "munitions" to face and combat piracy and armed robbery at sea.

West Africa Regional approach to maritime threats
As recently pointed our by the Security Council[16], it is a manner of a greater importance, "adopting a comprehensive approach led by the countries of the region to counter the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and their underlying causes" .

Attacks in West Africa happen mostly in the Gulf of Guinea's area, especially – but not solely- in the Niger's delta area[17]. However, especially in the last couple of years, Benin has been very much concerned about the attacks, as well[18]. Nevertheless, every coastal state of West Africa is somehow affected by this phenomenon and should therefore cope with it and find a way to combat it. The most of the attacks happen in territorial waters, so that they represent a domestic issue. According to some observers[19], all the regional coastal states possesses a maritime security service of some kind, but "collectively they lack the size, structure, assets and training to operate effectively to meet security requirements". Generally speaking West Africa has a fragile maritime response capability in its waters. As said above, most of the attacks that happen in the Gulf of Guinea occur in the domestic waters if not in the port areas, which means that are mainly domestic issues. This means that it's national coastguards' work to put their efforts and capabilities in the fight against armed robbery. At the same time, the coastal states should enhance their capability to process and prosecute all the criminal attacks that occur in their waters.

In 2008 all the 20 MOWCA's States, combined their efforts and capabilities and adopted, also thanks to the IMO 's intercession, a Memorandum of Understanding, establishing a sub regional integrated coast guard network, a center for information aiming at reinforcing – and in same cases creating – cooperation among regional countries to counter mounting problems with piracy[20]. Generally speaking, the MoU *"provides an institutional framework for suppressing piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against ships and addressing illegal fishing, drug and weapon*

[16] http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2039(2012)
[17] Piracy and ,aritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea" by Freedom C. Onuoha
[18]http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Guinea%20S%202012%2045.pdf, parag. 8
[19] "Advancing U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West Africa Maritime Domain" by John Raidt , pag. 27
[20] "The naval contribution to sustainable development in West and Central Africa" by Chris Trelawny, IMO News n. 4 2007; also see
http://content.yudu.com/A1vzbd/CoSAnnualReview2012/resources/25.htm;
http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1709&doc_id=9939

In general, in order to extirpate to the maximum extend maritime insecurity in the area, the population need to have valid alternatives of living that keep them away from committing crimes. Unfortunately, the military and the institutional apparatus –not only in Nigeria, but also in its neighbors in the Gulf of Guinea- are often implicated in the lucrative "bunkering" of oil. Transparency and fight against corruption are not priorities yet, but few achievements can be reached without those two premises. From another point of view[33], many coastal States in the area have a naval presence, but not very developed. Traditionally in the region, threats come from land, so that sea related problems have received less efforts and money compared to wars' answers.

If it is of primary importance to respond to maritime crimes both with regional and national answers, it is a prior matter to comprehend them under a same "umbrella". Each regional country's maritime security sector should be led by the same strategic vision and should adopt a common maritime security policy, which the various international actors could support in the different components. A legitimate maritime security sector should be a part of a broader governance policy, both at a national and regional level. It has to be legitimate both at the eyes of the population and of the international community.

Piracy and armed robbery in West Africa are just one of the maritime threats that undermine the region's stability. Connected to piracy are the problems of illegal fishing, drug trafficking, smuggling, arms' trafficking, piracy, armed robbery are just a symptom of bigger problems that occur on land at a governmental level. That is why is of vital importance to tackle maritime security's threats with a strategic and comprehensive approach, rather than focusing on them solely from a - sometimes too- specific point of view.

Even though the responses taken in the region to counter piracy and armed robbery have positive sides and potentialities, nevertheless they lack to be inserted in a general framework. Various States in West Africa deal with a very low level of confidence in their institutions by the population. Corruption is one of the main problems that undermine the legitimacy and there can't be effective and positive developments if those don't start from the national actors.

SSR's objective is, therefore, to help to set out policies, plans, programs and activities that a government can undertake to improve the way it provides maritime safety, security and justice. The overall aim, then, would be to help West African States to provide the above mentioned services in a way that promotes a legitimate and transparent public service.

---

[33] "The naval contribution to sustainable development in West and Central Africa" by Chris Trelawny, IMO News n. 4 2007;

Key questions for follow up:

1) The entire international community in the past years looked at the massive – also monetary - efforts taken by a number of entities and organizations, to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden that has been indeed useful. Recently, the worldwide attention shifted to the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. Is there the risk that the West Africa regional states now pledging for help are trying to take advantage of the international money?

2) Should there be a strict control on how, to whom and where the helps would be directed to, in order to avoid governments and companies' financial improprieties?

3) In States where the population's level of trust in the institutions are that low, how can be responses effectives, since they should be implemented by the governments themselves?

4) Most of the recent attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are "oil-related" and Niger's Delta rebels are often involved. How could the international oil companies exploiting that area help the institutional players – national, regional and international – in the fight against maritime "piracy"?

5) The Gulf of Guinea is affected by many different maritime threats: not only armed robbery, but also drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal fishing, weapon trafficking, etc. Should the regional States adopt a comprehensive strategy to fight all the above mentioned crimes, or it would be better to tackle those problems with a "personalized" approach?

For contacts: Avv. Francesca Pradelli

Mail: francescapradelli@turcilex.it
   f.pradelli@gmail.com